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This thesis examines the use of a simulation model as a method Industrial 
Operations Command, U.S. Army, can use to assess container operations at its eleven 
munitions depots. The model, called AmmoBox, is tailored to depot container procedures 
and equipment resource constraints. It provides data on daily container output, and 
container processing time. Hawthorne Army Depot is used to illustrate the process. The 
model approximates the depot's container capability, and the simulation results assist to 
determine the equipment augmentation needed to meet depot mobilization goals. 
Container enhancement projects are also evaluated with AmmoBox. The model- 
generated data reflect the impact of changes to depot procedures and infrastructure. 
These data on daily container output and container processing time are recommended for 




The reader is cautioned that computer programs developed in this research may 
not have been exercised for all cases of interest. While effort has been made, within the 
time available, to ensure that the programs are free of computational and logic errors, they 
cannot be considered validated. Any application these programs without additional 
verification is at the risk of the user. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Through the Army Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP), efforts are underway 
within the munitions logistics system to more fully utilize container operations. Capability 
studies have identified infrastructure shortfalls and have forwarded corrective 
recommendations. This thesis focuses on one specific area within the ASMP, the Army 
ammunition depots and activities which originate munitions shipments. 
Industrial Operations Command (IOC), U.S. Army, oversees eleven munitions sites 
in the United States. Each year, IOC identifies projects and equipment requirements 
needed to enhance munitions shipments at its depots. Projects are prioritized within each 
budget year, and budget account (e.g., Operations and Maintenance, or Military 
Construction). IOC desires a means to reduce subjectivity from this annual review 
process, and establish a ASMP project ranking and evaluation using objective criteria. 
Some of the methods used to develop these criteria can also be employed to assess depot 
container capability, and to identify depot resource shortfalls. 
A simulation model was developed to emulate the process of preparing, stowing, 
and shipping containers of munitions at an Army ammunition depot. While each depot's 
operations are unique, generic processes were modeled. These included arrival of the 
containers at the depot; inspection and repair of the container; movement of the containers 
to a stuffing location; stuffing the container with the munitions; and loading of the 
container onto a truck or train for transport off-site. The model, AmmoBox, provided 
measures of daily container output, and container processing time. 
xni 
To illustrate the use of this simulation model, AmmoBox was tailored to 
operations at Hawthorne Army Depot (HWAD). First, it was used to assess the depot's 
capability to meet its mobilization goal of 188 containers per day. Given current depot 
equipment resources, the simulation showed a daily output of only 119 containers. The 
model indicated extensive delays in operations due to a shortage of Container Handling 
Equipment (CHE) and transfer tractors. Additionally, the number of container inspection 
sites appeared to contribute to container output capability. These three factors were 
examined in greater detail. Shortfalls in equipment resources were identified and a 
recommendation made on the equipment augmentation needed to meet mobilization 
requirements. 
Second, two hypothetical ASMP projects were reviewed using AmmoBox. Data 
was generated on the projects' effects on container output and processing time. One 
project changed container production procedures; the other infrastructure. Two 
performance measures, daily container production, and improvement in container 
processing time were then used as the inputs to a proposed decision support system. 
Intriguingly, cases were found where container output would improve simultaneously with 
a decrease in efficiency (i.e., time to process the container would increase). Historically, 
depot performance has been measured solely based upon daily container production. The 
author recommends an alternative measurement geared towards container processing 
efficiency be used, as well, in evaluating and prioritizing ASMP projects. Container 
output would continue as an important criteria which must be met by the proposed 
xiv 
enhancement project, but it would not drive the funding decision. Instead, IOC could 
adopt a minimum output requirement for each depot. This would bound the choices of 
projects to be funded, and serve as a constraint within the decision support model. The 





The purpose of this thesis is to develop methods the U.S. Army Industrial 
Operations Command can employ to evaluate and prioritize projects at its eleven 
munitions sites. The end result of each improvement project is to enhance container 
shipping operations at munitions depots located in the United States. A simulation model 
will be used to examine container procedures at Hawthorne Army Depot. The simulations 
will provide some insight into current practices, and develop measures of effectiveness for 
grading enhancement projects. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Weapon systems have evolved dramatically from those employed during World 
War II, yet the logistics system used to supply the field with the bullets and bombs for 
these systems has changed little. Originating at Army ammunition depots in the United 
States, munitions are sent to the field using essentially the same delivery system employed 
during World War II. Palletized munitions are loaded from the depots onto trucks and 
trains, transported to loading ports, and stowed in holds of breakbulk cargo ships for their 
sea transit. This reliance on breakbulk operations is considered antiquated, and has been 
largely replaced in the commercial transportation system through the use of containers and 
the emergence of intermodal networks (De La Pedraja, 1992 ). 
Policy makers acknowledge the efficiency and effectiveness of containers, and the 
Department of Defense (DoD) has extensively studied the use of containers for its logistics 
system. These efforts focus on the shipment of resupply and munitions. In 1970, the 
Army used containers for the first time to ship munitions to Vietnam. This early 
experiment proved successful, and led to the Army's procurement of containers called 
MILVANs specifically designed for munitions (Transportation Systems Center (TSC), 
1988, pp. 46-49). Containers are used by the Marine Corps for storage of munitions on 
Maritime Prepositioned Ships, and by the U.S. Army for munitions shipments from the 
United States and to installations in Germany. Most recently, TURBO CADS 94 tested 
the use of commercial containers to move munitions to and from the West Coast. Despite 
success using containers, Operation Desert Storm units received 95 percent of their 
munitions via breakbulk shipments (Corsano, 1993, pp. 21). With 25 years of study, 
research, and planning, the infrastructure necessary to exploit the efficiencies of container 
movement has not fully been implemented within the DoD logistic network. 
Through the Army Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP), efforts are underway 
within the munitions logistics system to more fully utilize container operations. Capability 
studies have identified infrastructure shortfalls and have forwarded corrective 
recommendations. This thesis focuses on one specific area within the ASMP, the Army 
ammunition depots and activities which originate munitions shipments.   The thesis will 
provide methods to measure the effectiveness of proposed infrastructure projects, and 
identify issues which need to be addressed for the efficient movement of munitions using 
containers. 
C. THE USERS 
There are two primary users for data and procedures developed herein. They are 
the Industrial Operations Command (IOC) and the Military Traffic Management 
Command,   Transportation  Engineering  Activity  (MTMC-TEA).     Both   are  Army 
commands. 
Each of the Service components assumed responsibility for their unique munitions 
supply system until the end of the Vietnam War. In 1975, these activities were 
consolidated by assigning the Army as the single manager for conventional ammunition 
(TSC, 1988, pp. 46). The Army Armament-Material Readiness Command became the 
Army's agent for overall responsibility for Continental United States (CONUS) munitions 
plants, depots and activities. The Army received additional tasking to formulate and 
implement a centralized Containerized Ammunition Distribution System (CADS). The 
acronym CADS is still used today. The Armament Material-Readiness Command, 
however, has undergone several name changes and is now known as the Industrial 
Operations Command (IOC). 
IOC oversees eleven munitions sites in the United States.   For purpose of this 
thesis, all munitions sites will be referred to as depots.  The depots' missions are varied 
including production and renovation, storage and shipment, and demilitarization and 
disposal of conventional ammunition. IOC categorizes its depots using a three-tier 
system. Tier One depots are deemed most critical and form the active core of IOC assets. 
Tier One depots are fully manned. Tier Two depots are important to DoD war fighting 
capability but are only partially manned during peacetime. Lastly, Tier Three depots serve 
predominately as the long-term storage sites for obsolete munitions (Welker, 1994, pp. 
22). 
Military Traffic Management Command - Transportation Engineering Activity 
(MTMC-TEA) is a secondary user for material within this thesis. MTMC-TEA conducts 
surveys and assessments on ports and depots to determine their capabilities to meet 
mobilization requirements. Engineering studies evaluate depot equipment assets, internal 
transportation structure (rail and road), and site procedures. From this data MTMC-TEA 
reviews depot shipment potential for both breakbulk and container operations. If 
shortfalls exist between the Army Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP) requirements and 
depot capability, MTMC-TEA provides recommendations for bridging the requirement - 
capability gap. MTMC-TEA reports address additional needs for upgrade and repair of 
existing depot infrastructure, such as road and rail. MTMC-TEA's recent efforts in this 
area have included the use of simulation to assess throughput capabilities. 
Recommendations from the engineering reports form the basis for IOC sponsored 
projects at each depot.  Funding for the projects is sought annually by IOC through the 
Program Operation Memorandum (POM) process and each proposed POM project is 
aimed at improving or maintaining depot capability for container munitions shipments. 
D. THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Funding is not available for all IOC sponsored projects. During each budget cycle, 
decision makers consolidate all projects into a single request. The request covers the 
current fiscal year, one budget and four out-years. Projects are ranked with others for that 
year in either the Military Construction, or the Operations and Maintenance budget line 
(AMCCOM, 1994). IOC desires a means to remove subjectivity from the process and 
establish project ranking through evaluation of objective criteria. This thesis explores 
several methods and measures of effectiveness which could be used in this process. 
Secondly, some of the methods can be utilized to provide IOC with data on current 
container capability at its depots including their ability to meet ASMP requirements. 
E. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
Each of the eleven depots are uniquely configured. A simulation designed to 
capture the spirit of operations at Hawthorne Army Depot can not be used for Blue Grass 
Army Depot. Modeling each of the eleven depots exceeded the time available. As a 
result, a simulation program for only Hawthorne was designed. The model development 
for this site can be used to tailor similar simulations to the other remaining depots. The 
simulation program developed does not pretend to capture the intricacies of all operations 
at the site. Only aggregate container shipment procedures were modeled. The method of 
analysis and measures of effectiveness developed are applicable to all depots. 
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is presented in six chapters. Chapter I serves as an introduction to the 
research issues. Chapter II gives the reader background on the different modes of 
shipment, specifically the differences between breakbulk and container operations. 
Chapter III discusses the processes simulated in the model AmmoBox. This model is used 
in Chapter IV to assess container operations at Hawthorne Army Depot. Chapter V 
briefly describes the use of simulation-derived data in a decision support system. Chapter 
VI summarizes thesis research findings and their applicability to IOC and MTMC-TEA. 
II. CONTAINER OPERATIONS 
World War II provided the impetus and inspiration for the use of containers to ship 
cargo (De LaPedraja, 1992, pp. 200). 
Under the wartime emergency, major savings in speed, efficiency, and cost 
had been made by sending mixed cargo inside palletized boxes (boxes 
stacked on top of flat trays). So impressed was the War Shipping 
Administration with the savings in time and labor that it conducted special 
trial runs using containers instead of palletized boxes and achieved 
phenomenal results. 
In the early 1960's, this method for transporting cargo was introduced into the commercial 
industry. Two shipping companies, Sea-Land and Matson, began using containers for 
ocean transport of cargo (Corsano, 1993, pp. 7). Previously, cargo transported by sea 
was loaded on pallets in the holds of breakbulk ships. Intermodal networks now exist to 
move cargo in containers from its origin to its destination using truck, rail, and ship. 
Containerization has succeeded because it saves the shipper and the consignee money. 
There are many advantages to containerized cargo. 
• Labor costs for moving cargo from one transportation mode to the next 
are reduced. It takes less time to move a container from a rail car to a 
container ship than it does to move the equivalent dozen pallets from a 
boxcar to a breakbulk ship. 
• Administrative savings are realized due to fewer in-transit inventories. 
• The primary savings to the customer is through reduction in transit time 
for moving their goods to destination. 
The cost savings are immense, but so too is the capital investment to implement a 
containerized  intermodal   system.     The  intermodal   container-support  infrastructure 
investment is the principle disadvantage to container operations (Johnson and Garnett, 
1971, pp. 50 - 51). DoD has extensively studied the use of containers for the shipment of 
war materials. The U.S. flagged commercial fleet can not support the mobilization sealift 
requirements of the military without the extensive use of container ships, there are simply 
too few breakbulk ships remaining in service. In addition, the commercial sector has in 
place an entire intermodal network of rail and truck to expedite shipments made using 
containers. In general, unit equipment (e.g., tanks, construction equipment, tank trucks, 
etc.) are not conducive to containerization. However munitions and resupply materials 
can successfully exploit the advantages of containers and the speed of container shipment. 
A. BREAKBULK AMMUNITION SHIPMENTS 
Breakbulk operations are labor, time, and material intensive. Breakbulk 
ammunition shipments are packaged on pallets. At the depot, the pallets are carefully 
loaded into truck beds and boxcars. Each pallet must be stowed in a manner which 
prevents shifting or jostling in transit. To effect safe transport, a procedure called 
blocking and bracing is performed for each load. Lumber (called dunnage) and cloth 
straps are used to secure the pallets in place. The blocking and bracing procedure is the 
most time-intensive phase of the loading operation. 
When the munitions arrive at the seaport, the pallets are discharged from their land 
transport and prepared for loading in the ship. Each pallet must be loaded individually. 
The ship itself is prepared to receive the explosive cargo.   The cargo holds are lined 
(sheathed) with wood to prevent inadvertent contact with the ship's metal structure. This 
is necessary to limit the possibility of a metal-to-metal spark between the ship's structure 
and the palletized munitions. It takes an additional one to two days to sheath a ship 
(Yocum, 1995). Lumber became a scarce resource, especially at island ports such as 
Guam, and Hawaii. So scarce was sheathing material that a load of mahogany from the 
Philippines was used to sheath one ship. Once pallets are loaded into the ship's holds, 
they must be blocked and braced with additional dunnage to prevent shifting during the 
voyage. The process is repeated still again when the munitions are discharged from the 
ship and moved by land conveyance to the user command. 
B. CONTAINERIZED AMMUNITION SHIPMENTS 
Rather than moving pallets, munitions can be loaded into containers for its journey 
from the depot to the area of operations. Containers are large metal boxes which come in 
a variety of sizes and types. The box of choice for munitions is a MIL VAN. This type of 
container is a 8-feet wide, 8-feet high and 20-feet long rectangular box. The box has an 
internal constraint system with built in rails and adjustable crossbars to assist in the secure 
stowage of explosives (Corsano, 1993, pp. 39). Commercial twenty foot containers can 
also be employed, as well as 8-feet wide, 4.25-feet high and 20-feet long containers known 
as half-highs. The half-highs have no metal top, but instead are covered with a tarpaulin. 
These unique containers are used for transport of very heavy munitions whose density-to- 
volume ratio makes the use of the MIL VAN impractical (Corsano, 1993, pp. 41).   The 
weight of normal munitions prevents them from being moved in the commercially more 
common 40 foot containers. 
Munitions on pallets are loaded directly into the containers. Blocking and bracing 
occurs inside the container. The containers are then loaded on truck chassis and rail cars 
for transit to the seaport. At the port the container, not the individual pallets of munitions, 
are discharged from their land conveyance and loaded onto container ships. The Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) planning calls for the sea transport of the munitions using U.S. 
flagged commercial container ships. No special preparation of the ships is required. The 
commercial vessels are designed to accommodate both 20 and 40 foot boxes. The 
container ships need not be sheathed, as the munitions are stowed securely in their 
containers. No additional blocking or bracing of the containers is required. At their 
destination, the containers can be discharged directly from the ship to truck or rail. 
Moving munitions by container, eliminates the need to block and brace the munitions at 
each change of transportation mode. 
C. BREAKBULK VERSES CONTAINER AMMUNITION SHIPMENTS 
Container shipments thus save costs in terms of labor and material. More 
importantly to DoD, the time required to move material by containers is reduced. 
However, there are difficulties associated with container operations. Containers of 
munitions weigh, on average, 14.5 short tons. The forklifts used to move pallets of 
munitions are not designed to move such heavy loads. Additionally, the size of a container 
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eliminates its handling by a conventional forklift. Consequently, at the depot, seaport and 
intermediate transportation junctions, container-capable forklifts and other container 
handling equipment is required. The cost and availability of this container handling 
equipment is not a difficult problem for shipments within the U.S. It could be a<rt 
insurmountable problem to solve in some theaters of operation where container handling 
equipment would need to be positioned prior to the arrival of the munitions shipments. 
This lack of container handling equipment was the primary reason cited by Desert Storm 
commanders for their reluctance to employ containerized munitions shipments. 
Sea ports must also have special equipment for container operations. Breakbulk 
ships are termed self-sustaining because they are equipped to discharge their own cargo 
without the assistance of shore-side cranes. Container ships, normally, are non-self 
sustaining and require special shore cranes to discharge and load the containers. Many 
third world ports are underdeveloped and incapable of accommodating the modern 
container ship. Consequently, DoD plans call for the inclusion of both breakbulk and 
container shipments of ammunition. JCS uses the planning factor of 70 percent container 
and 30 percent breakbulk. However, as was the case in Operation Desert Storm, the 
theater commander is the final decision maker on the mix of shipment mode. 
D. IMPACT OF SHIPMENT MODE ON MUNITIONS DEPOTS 
The depots must be prepared to ship munitions using both breakbulk and container 
operations. Many depots lack the necessary infrastructure and the equipment for efficient 
11 
containerized shipment. This thesis focuses exclusively on depot container operations. 
Analysis methodology will be established to assess capability. To date, no major 
mobilization has tested the depots ability for a massive container effort. No data therefore 
exist to document depot performance under mobilization. A computer simulation is thus 
used to approximate the depot operations in such an environment. 
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III. THE MODEL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
AmmoBox is an object-oriented simulation program which models the process of 
preparing, stowing, and shipping containers of munitions at an Army ammunition depot. 
While each depot's operations are unique there are generic steps common in all container 
operations. AmmoBox emulates each of these steps. The basic process includes the 
arrival of containers at the depot; inspection and repair of the container; movement of the 
containers to a stuffing location; stuffing the container with munitions; and loading of the 
container on a truck or train for transport off-site. The simulation can be further refined 
and tailored to capture the unique methods depot managers have implemented to 
accomplish their mission. 
Equipment availability is a primary constraint to container operations. The number 
of containers stuffed during a day is dependent upon having sufficient numbers of forklifts 
to move munitions pallets into containers. Other equipment is necessary to move the 
containers to and from loading sites. A type of equipment may be needed for many steps 
within the process. For example, Container Handling Equipment (CHE) is needed to lift 
the container onto an inspection rack during the inspection phase. It is also required to lift 
a loaded container onto a rail car. The model examines the impact of resource 
competition among the container processing steps. 
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AmmoBox uses two measurements to assess container operations at the depot. 
The average time required to move an empty container, stuff it, and load it onto a train or 
truck is the first measure. The daily output of containers from the depot is the second 
measurement. AmmoBox is predominately a deterministic model with the time to process 
a container and the depot's container output driven by container operating procedures and 
the availability of equipment resources. 
B. CONTAINER OPERATIONS 
1. Container Arrival, Inspection, and Repair 
The depot has a small number of containers pre-staged at the facility. To maintain 
container operations beyond a few days, more containers must be dispatched from Army 
and commercial sources. It takes seven days for containers to be ordered and shipped to 
the depots (Shuck, 1994). Once the first order of containers arrives at day seven, the 
model assumes a continuous daily supply of containers. 
On arrival, the container is off-loaded and moved to an inspection site. For 
efficiency, the off-load and inspection site are normally co-located. This conserves chassis 
and transfer tractor resources which otherwise would be required to move the box. The 
inspection phase of operations requires the container to be lifted onto an elevated rack. 
The box then can be inspected along all sides. Figure 1 diagrams the flow of operations at 














Figure 1. Container Arrival, Inspection and Repair Process Diagram 
If the container passes inspection, it is moved to an area allocated to ready-to-use 
containers. For ease of reference, this area will be referred as the container pool. 
Containers failing inspection are sent to a repair facility, if available, at the depot. Safety 
factors require ammunition be transported only in as new containers. A box can fail 
inspection if it has holes, rust, or malfunctioning doors. Containers can also be rejected if 
previously repaired at key structural joints. Historical rejection rates for containers range 
from 15 to 30 percent. Damaged containers which can not be repaired by the depots are 
returned to their source. 
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2. Container Loading Operations 
Inspection and repair of the containers is a necessary preliminary phase. The 
ultimate goal is to stow the containers with the munitions, and ship them off-site. Figure 2 












and Load on Rail 
or Truck 
Figure 2. Logic Diagram for Stowing Munitions in Containers 
Depot managers tailor each of these events to fit the lay-out and resources at their 
depots. Some magazines (also called igloos) have rail-capable loading docks; other more 
isolated magazines are accessible only by roadway. Although the intricacies of all methods 
were not modeled, two distinct methods of container loading are simulated. The location 
of container stuffing underscores the differences in the two processes. 
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In the first method, containers are moved by chassis and transfer tractor from the 
container pool to the igloo. Munitions from the igloo are loaded directly into the 
container, blocked, and braced in place. The container is then moved to a truck or rail 
loading site. Stuffing the containers at the igloos is the preferred mode of operations as it 
prevents double handling of the munitions. Figure 3 depicts this process for Hawthorne 
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Figure 3. Process of Stuffing Containers at Munitions Magazines 
In contrast, containers can also be stuffed at a consolidation location.   A semi- 
trailer is loaded with the munitions from the igloo, and transports the munitions to a 
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central location for stuffing into the assembled containers. While the munitions need not 
be blocked and braced within the semi-trailer, the acts of loading and discharging the truck 
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Figure 4. Process of Stuffing Containers at a Consolidation Site 
3. Model Implementation 
AmmoBox employs three objects to simulate control and movement of the 
containers through the depot. The first, DepotObj, controls the frequency and quantity of 
containers entering the depot.  The second object, ManageContainerObj maintains the 
container pool.   Inspected containers are dispatched to work sites upon request.   If no 
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container is available for issue within the pool, the request is held in abeyance until a 
container becomes available. A Uniform random variable is used to determine if a 
container will be dispatched for loading at the munitions magazine or a consolidation site. 
Random variables are also utilized for container inspection results and container repair 
times. Finally, the ContainerObj serves as a notional container which is inspected, 
repaired, and loaded with munitions. 
C. EQUIPMENT USED IN CONTAINER OPERATIONS 
Several different types of equipment are needed to load a container with 
ammunition and prepare it for transport off the activity. For example, the container must 
be moved from the container pool to the munitions magazine. The container is loaded 
onto a transport chassis and is then hauled by a transfer tractor to the magazine. At the 
magazine, forklifts are needed to move the pallets of munitions into the container. How 
each piece of equipment functions is not important; what is critical is its availability. 
Equipment is therefore modeled as a resource and not by its specific characteristics. Table 











Loads munitions pallets into containers and semi-trailers 
Moves semi-trailers and chassis within the depot 
Provides the frame and wheel base on which containers 
are placed. 
Truck bed to load munitions for transport within the 
depot 
Used to lift a container. Also used to move containers 
short distances  
Table I. Equipment and Its Use in Container Operations 
Three factors are considered when determining the quantity of equipment in the 
model: depot allowance, equipment availability, and equipment reliability. A munitions 
depot has an allowance for each type of equipment. From its allocation, a percentage of 
the equipment may be required for depot functions other than container operations. For 
example, Hawthorne has a mission to demilitarize and destroy obsolete munitions. 
Forklifts are needed to carry out this function and a certain number of forklifts must be set 
aside for this mission. In the model, forklift availability accounts for only the percentage 
of forklifts dedicated to container operations. Mechanical equipment requires maintenance 
and repair. Forklift reliability, then, relates to the percentage of available forklifts which 
are fully operational. To illustrate, 100 forklifts may be at the depot, but only 80 are 
available for container operations. Of those available, 20 percent may need some sort of 
maintenance or repair. The end result leaves 64 of the original 100 forklifts ready to be 
used for container operations. The allowance, availability and reliability are parameters 
within the model. 
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ManageEquipmentObj and EquipmentObj control and maintain the equipment 
resources. Requests for resources are issued from the ContainerObj as it progresses 
through the inspection, repair and loading phases. Equipment is issued to the container for 
the duration of the task, and returned to the ManageEquipmentObj upon task 
completion. If the desired equipment is already in use, the container's process is delayed 
until the equipment becomes available. 
D. THE EXPERIMENTAL PROCESS 
The author will focus on three areas in which AmmoBox can be used to gain 
insights into depot operations. A baseline simulation with current depot parameters will 
be used to determine if the facility can meet demands at the height of mobilization. 
Second, depot equipment resources will be reviewed to determine if deficiencies in 
container equipment limit depot production levels. Any equipment shortages will be 
investigated and a recommended equipment allowance provided. Finally, changes to 
depot procedures and/or infrastructure will be explored to provide a quantitative measure 
of a change on depot efficiency. The following chapter will detail the experimental 
method used and provide analysis on the results obtained. 
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IV. AMMOBOX AND HAWTHORNE ARMY DEPOT 
A. BACKGROUND 
Hawthorne Army Depot (HWAD) will be used to illustrate AmmoBox. The plant 
is a government-owned, contract-operated depot in Nevada. The largest of the IOC 
depots, it is a Tier-Two site. HWAD has over 2,600 magazines, and spans a 236 square 
mile area (MTMC-TEA, 1992, p. 24). Three sources of information were used to tailor 
AmmoBox to procedures and equipment resources at the Nevada depot. A site-visit by 
the author in August 1994 provided initial information on the environment and procedures 
used in handling munitions. Second, MTMC-TEA Report SE 92-3a-30, Army Strategic 
Mobility Plan Outloading Study, was used for initial data parameters and procedures at 
HWAD. Finally, HWAD personnel reviewed flow diagrams and parameters to ensure 
accurate depot representation. Outstanding assistance was provided to the author by all 
members of HWAD, and by Mr. Roger Straight of MTMC-TEA. Model parameters can 
be found at Appendix A. 
B. THE EXPERIMENT 
AmmoBox, tailored to operations at HWAD, will be used for two experiments. 
Annually, depots complete a Department of Defense Form 1726, OutLoad and Receiving 
Capabilities Report, in which managers estimate their facility's production of containers 
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during peacetime and mobilization. The first experiment compares the container output 
achieved using AmmoBox with that reported by HWAD on DD Form 1726. If 
differences in output figures exist, depot resources will be manipulated within the model to 
determine the resource mix required to meet HWAD's mobilization goals. 
The second experiment will use AmmoBox to model changes to HWAD container 
operations, and infrastructure. This experiment will illustrate the use of simulation to 
quantify the impact of IOC projects on depot container capability. 
C. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
The goal of AmmoBox is to provide decision makers with the ability to determine 
current depot capability and assess the impact of proposed changes to depot resources and 
operations. Two measures of effectiveness can be helpful in this assessment. The first 
measure calculates the time required to process a container for loading operations. The 
processing time begins with the dispatch of the container from the container pool to the 
time it is ready for loading on a truck or train. The inspection and repair time is not 
figured into this calculation because an inspected containers could reside within the 
container pool for a number of days before it was dispatched to a work site. The time to 
process a container is not intended for use between depots. Rather it is a measure of 
efficiency to apply between current depot practices and proposed alternatives for that 
depot. 
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The second measure of effectiveness is number of containers produced in a day. 
Container output is the conventional measurement used by IOC and MTMC-TEA. While 
this is an important figure for assessment of a depot's ability to meet ASMP requirements, 
it does not provide guidance as to the efficiency of container operations. 
While not used as a measure of effectiveness, a third calculation is performed 
within AmmoBox. A simple tally of equipment delays is maintained for delays in excess 
of fifteen minutes. This calculation can be used by analysts to determine the adequacy of 
resources at the depot. Additionally, it can identify choke points within the system. 
D. BASELINE ASSESSMENT 
HWAD loads containers both at munitions magazines and at consolidation sites. 
The initial simulation assumed a fifty percent split between the two loading strategies. 
With unlimited resources, the time required to process a container loaded at the magazine 
is 3.8 hours, and 4.9 hours when loaded at a consolidation site. Appendix A provides a 
breakdown of time increments for each phase of the process. 
Competition for equipment resources can lengthen processing time. A delay 
occurs if a piece of equipment is unavailable immediately for any phase of the operations. 
Simulation results show the average time to process a container is 5.1 hours, and the 
average number of containers processed upon attainment of full mobilization is 119 
containers a day. No equipment delays were experienced for forklifts, semi-trailers, or 
chassis. Numerous delays resulted from waits for transfer tractors and CHEs. In fact, the 
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number of waits for these pieces of equipment exceeded the total number of containers 
processed at HWAD. This suggests transfer tractors and CHE resources may be limiting 
container production at this depot. 
AmmoBox assumed five container inspection racks to be available. The time 
required to inspect the container, as previously mentioned, is not factored into the 
processing time computation (i.e., containers sent to the container pool would skew 
processing time results). The model does, however, tally any delays encountered during 
the inspection process. This number was significant. Of the 150 containers arriving daily 
to the site, 88 percent waited over 15 minutes in an inspection queue. 
E. HWAD MOBILIZATION GOALS 
HWAD's most recent OutLoad and Receiving Capabilities Report indicates a 
capability for processing 188 containers per day at full mobilization (Blackman, 1995). 
This figure conflicts with the AmmoBox baseline assessment of 119 containers per day, 
given the depots current resources. The author examined several factors to determine 
what resources significantly impact HWAD's ability to reach its output goal of 188 
containers. 
The first set of experiments included a 24 factorial design experiment. This process 
examines four parameters, known as factors, each at two levels, or values. Data runs are 
conducted at all possible combinations of factor-levels to determine the parameters' 
impacts on container output. In this case, a 24 factorial experiment results in 16 simulation 
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runs (Law and Kelton, 1991, pp. 659-670). Three of the four factors chosen were 
identified as important in the baseline simulation; namely, the number of transfer tractors, 
CHEs, and inspection sites. The number of work sites was selected as the fourth factor. 
While not a factor in the baseline experiment, the number of containers resupplied to the 
depot on a daily basis was increased from 150 to 200 a day to ensure an output of 188 
containers was possible. 
A simple regression on the simulation results served to screen factors for the next 
phase of simulation runs. Only main effects were considered in the screening assessment. 
Equation (1) provides the linear regression results which yielded an adjusted R-squared 
value of .72. In the equation, Xi represents the number of container work sites; X2, the 
number of inspection sites; X3, the number of CHE; and X4, the number of transfer 
tractors. The variable Y represents the average daily output of containers. The factor 
representing the number of work sites at the depot had little impact on container output (t- 
Test value of .2), and was removed as a factor from subsequent experiments. 
Y = 67 + .188Xi + 2.56X2 + 2.31X3 +2.34X, (1) 
This initial screening was followed by a more detailed, exhaustive experiment. A 
33 factorial experiment was used to examine the impact of CHE, inspection sites, and 
transfer tractors on daily container output. Each of these factors were explored at three 
levels. To further refine results, AmmoBox was used for five independent replications 
(i.e., data runs) for each factor-level combination.  This resulted in the collection of 135 
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data sample points.   A complete iteration of combinations and results can be found at 
Appendix B. Table II shows the factors and levels assessed. 
Factor Baseline 
Value 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 
Number of Inspection 
Sites 
5 5 6 7 
Number of Tractors 26 28 30 32 
Number of CHE 7 9 11 13 
Table H Factor and Level Design 
Again, a regression model was utilized to analyze the AmmoBox generated data. 
Several regression models were explored with mixed results. A quadratic equation 
incorporating interactive effects between variables was selected based upon its adjusted r- 
squared value of .98 and analysis of variance testing. In the equation below, Xi represents 
the number of CHEs; X2, the number of inspection sites; and X3, the number of transfer 
tractors. The variable Y represents the average daily output of containers. 
Y = 435.2 - 56.5X! - 65.6X2 + 12.2XÄ + 1.19(Xi)2- .04(X,X2)2 (2) 
The regression model is only viable within the experimental range of the factors. 
Equation (2) does indicate that the relationship between factors is inherently non-linear. 
Thus, the use of simple analytical models previously used by MTMC-TEA to assess 
requirements for additional equipment may not adequately address the interactive effects 
between resources. More helpful, are the results obtained by the simulation runs 
themselves. To meet the mobilization goal of 188 containers per day, a minimum of 11 
CHE, 28 transfer tractors, and six inspection sites are required. There is a strong 
interaction   between   the   number   of inspection   sites   and   the  number   of CHE. 
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Approximately the same level of container output (190 containers per day) can be 
achieved by increasing the number of CHE to 13 and reducing the number of inspection 
sites to five. The author recommends the former rather than later augmentation of 
resources, because AmmoBox does not account for potential congestion issues from using 
several CHEs within the same loading areas. The time delays associated with CHE 
interference could limit actual container output. Table III contains the results of the 
simulation, and predicted values using the regression model for these factor-level 
combinations. 
Factors-Levels Simulation Model Regression Model 
11 CHE, 6 Inspection Sites, 
28 Transfer Tractors 
187 194 
13 CHE, 5 Inspection Sites, 
28 Transfer Tractors 
190 197 
Table HI. Predicting Daily Container Output 
F. AMMOBOX AND PROJECT PROPOSAL ASSESSMENT 
In addition to analyzing depot capabilities, AmmoBox can be used to quantify the 
impact on infrastructure improvements and production changes to container operations. 
Four alternatives will be examined. Alternative A requires no change to operations or 
infrastructure, and is the baseline assessment previously discussed. Alternatives B through 
D will be compared to this baseline measure. Alternative B changes the location mix for 
container stuffing. Alternative C attempts to quantify the impact of building container 
loading pads. Finally, Alternative D combines both Alternative B and C, simulating a 
change in container stuffing and the addition of container loading pads. 
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1. The Alternatives 
Alternative A and B differ only in the proportion of containers stuffed at the 
munitions igloo. HWAD loads containers both at the igloo and at consolidation sites. The 
latter requires additional processing time to load and move the munitions from their 
storage location. HWAD continues to use consolidation sites, not because the process is 
more efficient, but because of customer requirements. The Army and Air Force want their 
units to receive munitions from the same batch-lot packaged together (i.e., in the same 
container) rather than mixed lot shipments (i.e., different batches in the same box). This 
allows units in the field to quickly isolate any batch-lots which become identified as 
defective. However, munitions lots may be stored at HWAD in different igloos. The use 
of consolidation sites allows the depot to match-up lots and package them accordingly. 
Alternative A is identical to the original baseline simulation where half of the 
incoming containers are stuffed at the igloo and the remaining are stuffed at a 
consolidation location. Alternative B requires an investment of capital to reallocate 
storage locations for munitions. Investment in the hypothetical storage project reduces the 
reliance on consolidation sites from 50 percent to 30 percent. 
Alternative C examines the impact of concrete loading pads slated for completion 
at HWAD in the Fall of 1995. Currently, CHE operate on unimproved soil-surfaced 
loading areas (i.e., desert floor). Inclement weather and heavy use can rut the loading 
areas and hamper container handling. The loading pads provide a stable surface from 
which to operate the CHEs, and should improve their efficiency by reducing the time 
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required to pick-up and move a container (MTMC-TEA, 1992 pp. 11). To capture the 
intention of the loading pad project, the time for each container operation involving CHE 
was reduced from 20 minutes to 15 minutes. No other changes to parameters were made. 
Finally, Alternative D reduces use of consolidation sites, and simulates the impact 
of container loading pads. In other words, Alternative D combines the two projects to 
determine if there is any interactive effect between them. 
2. Comparison of Alternatives 
Before discussing the results of the analysis, the practical applications of project 
comparisons must first be addressed. The intention of this experiment is to illustrate 
measures IOC could use as data inputs to a decision support model for prioritizing 
improvement projects amongst all of its depots. The measure defined by the time to 
process containers can be used to address questions of operational efficiency within 
HWAD but should not be used to compare HWAD with any other depot. Each depot's 
unique structural lay-out, and resource mix drive the time required to move, stuff and 
load a container. If the time to process a container at HWAD is 5.1 hours and the 
hypothetical time required at Blue Grass is 4.2 hours, one can not assert HWAD is less 
efficient. The disparity in times may only be attributable to Blue Grass's smaller size, and 
the shorter travel distance between container loading sites and igloos. 
Yet, a comparison can be made between projects at HWAD to determine if an 
alternative affords a measurable improvement upon current operations as represented by 
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Alternative A. With some level of statistical confidence, a statement can then be made as 
to the degree ofthat improvement. 
3. Comparison Analysis 
Fifteen replications were conducted for each of the four alternatives. The data 
output for the simulation runs contains two measures: average container output per day, 
and average time to process a container. Appendix C provides data tables used for the 
analysis. 
Each of the data runs provides a mean time to process a container. The processing 
times for the 15 replications were combined to provide an average processing time for 
each of the four alternatives. A t-Test was then used to determine the mean difference 
between Alternative A, the base case, and the three proposals. From the t-Test, the 
degree of improvement was then measured as a percentage derived by dividing Alternative 
A processing time by that of the project proposals (i.e., Alternatives B through D). 
Results are contained in Table IV. The analysis supports the assertion that if Alternative B 
were implemented at FfWAD, a two percent improvement would likely be realized. It 
does not purport that Alternative C, with an expected four percent increase in efficiency, is 
twice as good as Alternative B, with a two percent expected improvement. The 














4.92 .0001 26.0 2% 
C: Reduce CHE 
time 
4.81 .0004 20.89 4% 
D: Reduce 
CHE time and 
Consolidation 
4.51 .0000 33.79 10% 
Table IV. Processing Time Results and Comparison 
Analysis of daily container output results for the four alternatives yielded intriguing 
results.    Reducing the reliance on consolidation sites, rather than an improvement, 






A: Base Case 119 .106 .084 
B: Reduce 
Consolidation Sites 
110 .117 .088 
C: Reduce CHE time 154 .117 .088 
D: Reduce CHE time 
and Consolidation 
145 .106 .084 
Table V. HWAD Container Output 
How can operational efficiency be improved at the same time output is decreased? 
The answer lies within the methods used in AmmoBox to model stuffing containers at 
igloos and at consolidation sites. If no delays are experienced for equipment, it takes 3.8 
hours to process a container at a magazine, and 4.9 hours at a consolidation site.  Based 
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on this difference, one would anticipate a greater number of containers processed through 
the magazine sites during a day than through the consolidation sites. While 50 percent of 
the incoming containers go to magazine stuffing locations, more than 50 percent of a day's 
container output is attributable to these sites. 
Stuffing at the magazine calls for a container to be placed on a chassis by a CHE. 
The container and chassis are then moved to the igloo. In stuffing containers at a 
consolidation site, a CHE is only required at the end of the process to lift the loaded 
container onto a rail car or truck. Consequently, as more containers are processed at the 
magazine, the demand for CHE increase. As previously addressed, CHE are a scarce 
resource at HWAD. Delays for this equipment may increase the time to process the 
containers at the magazine, and consequently, decrease the number of containers 
processed at that site in a day. Even with this small increase in time attributed to waiting 
for equipment, stuffing at the magazine is inherently more time efficient (3.8 compared to 
4.9 hours). Hence the time to process a container using Alternative B can be improved, 
and simultaneously the output of containers reduced. 
Measuring the degree to which a project could improve depot operations has 
practical application in its use as input data to an optimization model. Container output 
can also be applied as a constraint in such a model. Chapter V will discuss how these 
measures could be used in a decision support system for determining funding priority for 
depot projects. 
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V. FROM SIMULATION TO OPTIMIZATION 
Chapters III and IV detailed the use of simulation to quantify depot operations. 
Further, container output and processing time were introduced as potential candidates for 
measuring container operations. This chapter explains how simulations, similar to 
AmmoBox, may be used to generate data which would comprise the basis for a decision 
support system. 
A. DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM 
Linear programming techniques are a tool which could be used to form the basis 
for a decision support system to assist in funding decisions. "Linear Programming is a 
mathematical procedure for determining optimal allocation of scarce resources. (Schräge, 
1991, pp. 1)." For IOC, the scarce resource is funding dollars, which must be allocated 
across a list of proposed container enhancement projects. Linear programming models are 
normally defined by an objective function, and a series of constraints which bound the 
problem to be solved. In the case of container enhancement projects, budgetary funds 
serve as a constraint, and the value gained (i.e., enhanced container operations) serves as 
the objective function. To develop a decision aid based on linear programming, the value 
of a each project must be defined by some measure (or measures). 
It is not the author's intention to mathematically develop a linear program for use 
by IOC, although the foundation one possible model will be described.   The results of 
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AmmoBox simulations discussed in Chapter IV were employed to develop the objective 
function and constraints for the following linear programming model. 
B. MODEL FORMULATION 
This simple model is described below.   A more complex, robust model could be 
further developed using this formulation as its basis. 
Indices: 
i = 1,..., a Alternative i at a given depot 
j = l,..., 11 Depot j 
Simulation Derived and Given Data 
Budget IOC budget 
MinOutputj ASMP minimum required container output for depot j 
ProcessTimeij Percent improvement in processing time for alternative i at 
depot j 
Outputij Container output for alternative i at depot j 
Costy Cost of alternative i at depot j 
Decision Variables 
Xy Binary variable representing a 
Objective Function 
Maximize L Ej (ProcessTimeij *Xy) 
Constraints 
Subject To: Zi Zj Costy 
£ (Output^ *Xy) 
£ Xij 
(3) 
< Budget (4) 
> MinOutputj Vj      (5) 
= 1 Vj (6) 
The decision variable in this formulation takes on values of either zero or one.  If 
an project alternative were selected for funding, its representative variable Xy- would take 
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on the value of one. A decision variable Xy would be created for each IOC project. 
Additionally, an Xy variable would also be required for that alternative which represents 
the current situation (i.e., base case) at each depot, with its associated cost of zero and a 
process time improvement also of zero. 
The objective function (Equation (3)) seeks to maximize improvements to 
container processing time across all IOC depots. Equation (4) ensures the sum of the 
costs of the selected alternatives are within the budgetary constraints. Equation (5) allows 
IOC to establish a minimum daily container output requirement for each depot. Lastly, 
Equation (6) ensures one and only one alternative is selected for each depot. 
C. DISCUSSION 
The described integer program shows just one way to optimize funding. The 
formulation allocates funding dollars across all depots and projects to maximize 
improvements realized in container processing time. The objective function could as easily 
direct maximization of container output at each depot. However, as explored in Chapter 
IV, it is possible to increase output while simultaneously reducing efficiency. By 
developing minimum output requirements for each depot, IOC would be able to ensure 




A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The purpose of this thesis was to develop methods and measures IOC could use to 
prioritize container enhancement projects at its eleven munitions depots. Two methods 
have been discussed. The first, simulation, allows the decision maker to derive data not 
currently assessable. Historical data are not readily available, as no IOC depot has 
performed sustained container operations at mobilization levels. Simulation programs, like 
AmmoBox, can be used to approximate the effect of mobilization on depot operations. 
The simulation can, in turn, be utilized as a tool to estimate the effect of changes to depot 
infrastructure and procedures. Through the use of AmmoBox, operations at HWAD were 
examined. Equipment shortages impacting the attainment of mobilization goals were 
identified. 
Two alternative projects, changing consolidation practices (i.e., change to 
procedures) and the addition of container loading pads (i.e., change to infrastructure), 
were modeled. From these experiments, data on two measures of container operations, 
time to process a container and daily container output were gathered. 
Simulation can be viewed as the first stage of the process, allowing the analyst to 
gather data not experientially available. The outputs from a simulation model can be used 
as the inputs to a decision support model. Chapter V described one such simple decision 
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model based upon linear optimization. The methods of simulation and optimization could 
be applied to most of IOC container enhancement projects, however they will not 
adequately address the viability of all ASMP projects. This type of analysis is most 
applicable to projects which affect container operation output or efficiency. ASMP 
projects which do neither may be best assessed via alternative forms of analysis. For these 
anomalies, a form of cost-benefit analysis may prove most practical. Appendix D briefly 
addresses on such project at Crane Army Ammunition Activity. 
B. FURTHER RESEARCH 
A myriad of factors impact depot capability to ship munitions in containers. 
AmmoBox concentrated on two key components, equipment resources and container 
handling procedures. Facets such as Net Explosive Weight (NEW), and depot rail and 
road infrastructure are important, and need to be incorporated into future depot simulation 
models (Straight, 1995). 
This thesis, as well as MTMC-TEA assessments, have made assumptions which 
may be unrealistic. Most notably, studies have assumed an unconstrained availability of 
empty containers. A depot's capability to output containers of ammunition is predicated 
on the depot receiving a steady flow of empty containers to load. Given current planning 
factors for shipping munitions, the Army simply does not own a sufficient number of 
containers to supply the depots during a major mobilization. The availability of containers 
is a recognized issue, and has recently been the focus of a MTMC-TEA study (Shuck, 
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1994).     Prepositioning containers at depots is yet another area requiring further 
investigation. 
Lastly, this research focused exclusively on munitions depots, and ignored the 
other elements of the munitions logistics system. When viewed in its entirety, the system 
acts like a network. The depots serves as a source node and the end user in the field, the 
demand node. Between the depot and the field are flow points, for example seaports and 
rail terminals. 
Starting at the sources of ammunition supply and moving toward 
the users, each point along the way has less capability to handle the 
workload than the one before it. So, if the depots and plants begin to 
outload at full capacity, they will overload the ports. If the ports load ships 
at full capacity, the in-theater receiving capability will be quickly 
overwhelmed and unable to move ammunition to the users...Increases in 
capacity at the CONUS end must be accompanied by similar increases at 
other nodes in the system to achieve balance (Volpe National 
Transportation Center, 1993, pp. 1-6). 
Further research is needed to link the impact of depot enhancement projects to other 
nodes within this logistics network. A seaport-throughput, simulation-based, model was 
recently developed by Argonne Laboratories for MTMC-TEA. Extending this new model 
to encompass the munitions depots may be a valuable step towards linking the depots to 
the munitions logistics network. 
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APPENDIX A. HAWTHORNE ARMY DEPOT RESOURCES AND 
CONTAINER OPERATION PARAMETERS 
Type Quantity Reliability Availability 
Forklifts 106 80% 80% 
Transfer Tractors 26 80% 85% 
Transfer Semi- 
trailers 
24 80% 85% 
Container Handling 
Equipment (CHE) 
7 50% * 100% 
Chassis 81 75% 100% 
Table VI. Equipment Resources 
Hours of operation per day 20hrs 
Percentage of containers moved by truck 28% 
Percentage of containers moved by train 72% 
Number of container inspection sites 52 
Amount of time to load container from chassis to rail car 20 mins. 
Table VII. Depot Operations 
Maximum number of trucks cycled through the depot (per 
day) 
50 
Number of rail cars per train 37 
Number of containers on a rail car 3.5 
Table Vm. Transportation Information 
1. Hawthorne reported 50 percent reliability. Author modified CHE reliability to be more 
consistent with that reported by MTMC-TEA. 
2. Figure based on author's judgment of inspection sites required to maintain a steady 
supply of containers to operations. 
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Number of magazine work sites 
Number of containers to be stuffed at each magazine 
Number of containers worked simultaneous at each work 
site  
Average time to stuff a container (includes set up time for 
stuffing site) 
Average transit time to stuffing site 
Number pre-staged containers 
Full mobilization container output goal per day 
Percentage of arriving containers which require repair 








Table IX. Container Operations 
Step 
Load container on chassis 
Transit to magazine 
Stuff munitions into container 
Transit from magazine 
Load container on rail car or truck 







Chassis and CHE 
Chassis and tractor 
Chassis and two forklifts 
Chassis and tractor 
CHE 
Table X. Container Loading At Munitions Magazines 
Step Time (in hours) Equipment Requirements 
Semi-trailer transits to magazine .5 Semi-trailer and tractor 
Load munitions into semi-trailer .5 Semi-trailer and two 
forklifts 
Transit to consolidation site .5 Semi-trailer and tractor 
Discharge munitions from semi- 
trailer 
1 Semi-trailer and two 
forklifts 
Stuff munitions into container 2.1 Two forklifts 
Load container on rail car or truck .33 CHE 
Table XL Container Loading At Consolidation Sites 
3. Hawthorne reported a 65 percent container rejection rate. Results from TURBO 
CADS 94 indicated a much lower container rejection rate. 
4: Repair times vary widely. AmmoBox employs a triangular distribution where repair 
times range from one to nine hours. 
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APPENDIX B.   HWAD MOBILIZATION DATA 





CHE 1 2 3 4 5 Mean 
H H H 211 211 211 212 212 211 
M H H 211 210 211 212 211 211 
L H H 189 189 190 190 190 190 
H M H 207 207 207 206 207 207 
M M H 207 207 207 206 207 207 
L M H 190 189 190 190 190 190 
H L H 200 201 201 201 200 201 
M L H 202 203 201 200 200 201 
L L H 189 190 191 190 190 190 
H H M 190 190 190 190 191 190 
M H M 186 187 187 187 187 187 
L H M 174 174 174 175 175 174 
H M M 190 190 190 190 190 190 
M M M 186 187 186 186 187 186 
L M M 175 175 175 175 174 175 
H L M 190 190 190 190 191 190 
M L M 186 187 187 187 187 187 
L L M 174 176 175 175 175 175 
H H L 166 167 167 167 168 167 
M H L 165 165 166 166 167 166 
L H L 159 160 160 160 160 160 
H M L 167 167 166 167 167 167 
M M L 165 166 165 166 166 166 
L M L 159 160 160 160 159 160 
H L L 166 167 167 168 168 167 
M L L 165 166 165 167 166 166 
L L L 159 159 160 160 161 160 
Legend 
Inspection Sites: H= 7 M= 6 L= 5 
Transfer Tractors: H = 32 M = 30 L = 28 
CHE: H=13 M=ll L= 9 
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APPENDIX C. HAWTHORNE ARMY DEPOT (HWAD) 
COMPARISON OF PROJECTS 
This appendix provides data from simulations using the model, AmmoBox. Four 
alternatives were reviewed and their impact on container output and processing time 
assessed. The alternatives are as listed: 
• Alternative A: Current depot operations; 
• Alternative B: Increase the percentage of incoming containers 
processed at the magazines from 50 to 70 percent; 
• Alternative C: Decrease CHE handling time from 20 to 15 minutes; 
• Alternative D: Decrease CHE handling time, and increase magazine 
loading of containers. 
Replication Alternative A Alternative B Alternative C Alternative D 
1 5.13 4.93 4.8 4.52 
2 5.15 4.92 4.8 4.52 
3 5.14 4.93 4.86 4.5 
4 5.12 4.92 4.81 4.51 
5 5.12 4.93 4.81 4.52 
6 5.11 4.92 4.8 4.52 
7 5.14 4.9 4.8 4.51 
8 5.12 4.9 4.8 4.52 
9 5.13 4.92 4.78 4.52 
10 5.13 4.9 4.81 4.51 
11 5.11 4.93 4.8 4.52 
12 5.13 4.93 4.84 4.52 
13 5.13 4.92 4.8 4.51 
14 5.12 4.93 4.8 4.51 
15 5.12 4.92 4.81 4.51 
Ta bleXIl   Time! fo Process Conta dners (in hours) 
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Alternative Mean Standard 
Error 
Variance 
Alternative A 5.12 .0029 .0001 
Alternative B 4.92 .0029 .0001 
Alternative C 4.81 .0049 .0004 
Alternative D 4.51 .0017 0000 









Alternative A and B .00013 0.1 28 26.004 
Alternative A and C .00012 .2 28 20.895 
Alternative A and D .00012 .5 28 33.794 
Table XIV. Comparison of Alternative A with Alternatives B-D (Time to Process) 
Replication Alternative A Alternative B Alternative C Alternative D 
1 118.6 110.5 153.7 144.2 
2 118.2 110 153.5 145 
3 118.7 110 153.6 144.3 
4 119.1 109.8 154 144.3 
5 118.6 110.4 153.4 144.7 
6 118.9 110.5 153.5 145 
7 118.4 110 153.4 144.2 
8 119.1 110 152.9 144.5 
9 119.1 110.6 153.5 144 
10 119 109.7 153.7 144.4 
11 118.5 110.9 153.7 145 
12 118.5 110.3 153.9 144.2 
13 118.9 110.2 153 144.5 
14 119.4 110.6 154.2 144.5 
15 118.7 110 153.8 144.8 
Table XV. Container Output per Day 
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Alternative Mean Standard 
Error 
Variance 
Alternative A 118.9 .0841 .106 
Alternative B 110.2 .0881 .1167 
Alternative C 153.6 .0883 .1170 
Alternative D 144.5 .0842 .1064 
Table XVI. Descriptive Statistics for Container Output 
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APPENDIX D. CRANE ARMY AMMUNITION ACTIVITY 
Container output and processing time measures may not adequately address all of 
the IOC projects. A proposal to build a container repair facility at Crane Army 
Ammunition Activity (CAAA) is one such project. CAAA is a Tier-One depot located as 
a tenant command at Naval Surface Warfare Center-Crane, Indiana. CAAA's mission is 
to produce and renovate; store and ship; and demilitarize and dispose of conventional 
ammunition. A 1993 Army Strategic Mobility Plan Study recommended several corrective 
actions to enable CAAA to meet its mobilization requirements, and included a proposal to 
build a MIL VAN Repair/Inspection Facility (URS, 1993, pp. 2). Current practice requires 
defective containers be returned to their source, primarily, Sunnypoint, North Carolina. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The proposed container repair facility would be collocated with a new 
containerization facility, and containers would be inspected at a single site instead of the 
four locations currently in use. If a container was found to be defective, it could be 
repaired at its inspection location. CAAA estimates it will be able to repair 95 percent of 
damaged containers with the new facility. The remaining five percent would be returned 
to their source for disposal or repair. 
The repair facility is unlikely to increase CAAA container output capability. To 
judge the viability of the project wholly on container output or processing time would be 
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a mistake. This project has the potential to save the government transportation costs 
associated with returning unusable containers. This cost is substantial. The cost of 
shipping a empty container to Sunnypoint is $2612. The cost of building the repair facility 
is $1.45 million (CAAA, 1994). The remainder of this chapter will compare these 
expenses over a ten-year period using two scenarios. The results from the assessment are 
not intended for incorporation into an optimization-type model. They are, instead, an 
example of factors which may require independent consideration from any IOC-adopted 
decision support model. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
A simple economic analysis was conducted contrasting two alternatives, over two 
scenarios. Alternative A portrays CAAA's current situation, and Alternative B represents 
CAAA with a new container repair facility. The first scenario examines the costs incurred 
during peacetime for the two alternatives. The second scenario explores the impact of a 
major contingency (e.g., mobilization) occurring at year six in a ten-year period. 
Assumptions used for both scenarios are summarized as follows. 
• The container repair facility is built in year 1 of the scenario. 
• The cost of the container repair facility is $ 1.45 million. 
• On average, 150 containers are processed each year. 
• The rejection rate for containers is 20 percent. 
• In Alternative B, 5 percent of the rejected containers could not be 
repaired. 
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• A labor rate of $40.68 was used. In Alternative A, extra labor costs 
were charged against rejected containers at a rate of $13.56 each. 
• Labor and material costs to repair the container were the same for 
Sunnypoint and CAAA. 
• Rejected containers are returned to Sunnypoint, for a transportation 
cost of $2612 each. 
• A discount rate of 8 percent was used. Net present value of 
alternatives were compared at the end of year 10. 
C. PEACETIME SCENARIO 
Currently, CAAA handles approximately 150 containers a year (CAA\, 1994). 
Given a rejection rate of 20 percent, 30 of these containers require repair. These figures 
were used to compute a ten year cost cycle to determine the Net Present Value (NPV) of 
building a repair facility as opposed to returning defective containers to their source. In 
this analysis, the labor and material costs associated with repair of the container was 
assumed to be the same regardless of the location. A transportation cost of $2612 was 
assessed against each rejected container. This cost is conservative as it takes into account 
only returning the rejected container, and does not capture the cost of shipping a 
replacement container to CAAA. 
Results found that during normal operations, it is more cost effective to return the 
containers to their source. The NPV for Alternative A, no repair facility, was $528,532. 
In contrast, the NPV for CAAA with a repair facility was $1,403,552. The wide disparity 
in values suggest small variances in assumptions will make no difference in the ranking of 
the two alternatives.   A sensitivity analysis showed CAAA would need to process 450 
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Containers a year before it became more advantageous to build a container repair facility. 
A list of thresholds for parameters is provided in Table VI. 
Parameter Range of Parameter Parameter Threshold 
Number of containers 
per year 
150-450 450 
Rejection rate of 
containers 
20-60% 60% 
Discount rate 8-20% Did not change ranking 
Life cycle length 10-20 years 20 years 
Table XVII. Peacetime Scenario Sensitivity Analysis 
D. MOBILIZATION SCENARIO 
In Scenario 2, a major mobilization occurs at year six. The other years are handled 
with the same assumption as in the peacetime scenario. During the contingency, 
operations at CAAA reach the required ASMP levels of 104 containers a day (CAAA, 
1994). This tempo of operations is sustained for 30 days for a total of 3120 containers 
processed during the surge. The same number of containers are retrograded (i.e., 
returned) to the facility. The total number of containers handled by CAAA during year six 
is then 6240. 
Further, transportation costs for rejected containers, during surge operations, are 
doubled. The two-way transportation charge is justified for two reasons. First, 
insufficient MILVANs exist within the Army system to accommodate a major crisis. 
Containers thus become a valuable commodity and a container needlessly in transit is a 
wasted resource. Second, if a container is rejected, a replacement is required. The Army 
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then has paid for the round-trip transportation of an unused commodity and the $5624 
charge is a more realistic assessment of actual costs. 
Results show, given a major contingency, the CAAA container repair facility will 
accrue substantial savings for the Army (See Figure 5). 
Economic Analysis: Normal Operations vs 
Contingency Mobilization 
s $4,000,000 
>   $3,000,000 
| $2,000,000 
& $1,000,000 + 
$0 <U 





Figure 5. Net Present Value of CAAA Container Repair Facility Alternatives 
The dramatic increase in container use during mobilization causes a corresponding 
increase in transportation costs. The timing of the crisis, within the ten-year life cycle 
impacts the costs but not the overall result. Regardless of whether a contingency occurs 
at year three or year ten, it is always less expensive to have built the repair site. Figure 4 
graphically portrays the two scenarios and their associated costs in terms of NPV. 
The economic value of building a container repair facility at CAAA yields 
conflicting results. If one assumes normal operations for the activity, then it is not cost 
effective to build the repair facility. Conversely, given a mobilization scenario such as 
Desert Storm, the opposite is true. Which scenario used, peacetime or mobilization, is a 
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decision for policy makers. The importance of this analysis is to illustrate that a project 
may be cost-effective and viable, even if no improvement on depot efficiency or output is 
anticipated. 
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